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This essay uses Arnaldo Momigliano’s genealogy of antiquarianism and historiography 
to propose a new method for engaging the past. Momigliano traced antiquarianism from 
its advent in ancient Greece and later growth in Rome to its early modern efflorescence, 
its usurpation by history, and its transformation into anthropology and sociology in 
late modernity. Antiquarianism performed for Momigliano the work of excavating past 
archives while infusing historiographical inquiry with a much-needed dose of contingen-
cy. This essay aims to advance our understanding of the mutual imbrications of antiquar-
ian methods with modern conceptions of history, while also suggesting how antiquarian-
ism can generate alternatives to historical inquiry. 
Keywords: antiquarianism, genealogy, historiography, disciplinarity, Herodotus, contin-
gency, doubt, certainty 
Among the intellectual giants of the twentieth century, Arnaldo Momigliano 
(1908–1987) will be remembered as the historian who historicized history. In 
the aftermath of the copious festschrifts, memorial volumes, and critical stud-
ies that have appeared during the quarter-century following Momigliano’s 
death, this Italian intellectual is gradually emerging as the twentieth century’s 
most important scholar in two fields that rarely converge in the same intellect: 
ancient Roman history and the modern historiographical method. Like his near 
contemporary, Michel Foucault (1926–1984), for whom Momigliano expressed 
guarded admiration on many occasions, Momigliano bequeathed to us a geneal-
ogy of humanistic inquiry extending from antiquity to the present. Momigliano’s 
genealogy culminates in an empirically dense and theoretically ambitious vision 
concerning the mutual imbrications of history, antiquarianism, and the social sci-
ences, from antiquity to the present. 
Momigliano’s writings plot an itinerary for human knowledge as comprehen-
sive and richly suggestive as Foucault’s institutional genealogies of the asylum, 
the clinic, and the prison, as well as his disciplinary genealogy of philology, biol-
ogy, and political economy.2 But whereas Foucauldian genealogies expose power 
1. I would like to thank my research assistant Joshua Wong (Yale-NUS College) for his assistance 
with editing this essay.
2. Michel Foucault, Folie et déraison: Histoire de la folie à l’âge classique (Paris: Plon, 1961); 
Naissance de la clinique: Une archéologie du regard medical (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 
1963); Les mots et les choses (Paris: Gallimard, 1966); Surveiller et punir: Naissance de la prison 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1975). 
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in the process of its emergence from various fields of knowledge, Momiglianian 
genealogies register the traces of the past on the present. Further, Momigliano 
elucidates the specificity of history by comparing it with disciplines that engage 
the past without self-identifying as history.3 This essay examines the most sug-
gestive knowledge form that falls under this rubric, which Momigliano termed 
“antiquarian knowledge.” 
The antiquarian concept usefully identifies a form of knowledge not always 
registered within conventional history, particularly in its nineteenth- and twenti-
eth-century iterations. Momigliano was hardly the first scholar to consider anti-
quarianism as a form of knowledge unto itself. Prior to Momigliano’s intervention, 
however, no scholar had studied antiquarianism with reference to the sea changes 
introduced by modern disciplinary knowledge, nor had ancient antiquarianism 
been considered in relation to modern knowledge forms such as history. In these 
respects, Momigliano’s interventions were new. In order to better discern the new-
ness of Momigliano’s concept of antiquarianism, we must begin with a genealogy 
of the genealogical principle from which antiquarianism derives. We should also 
consider the framing of the genealogical method by the thinker whom Momigliano 
recognized as its most influential modern practitioner, Michel Foucault.
ANTIQUARIAN GENEALOGY
In different ways and for different reasons, genealogy preoccupied both Momi-
gliano and Foucault throughout their writing careers. Often this preoccupation 
was accompanied by an engagement with genealogy’s preferred medium, arche-
ology. Archeology meant different things for Foucault and Momigliano, but the 
term surfaces frequently in both oeuvres as a concrete manifestation of the genea-
logical method, uniting the otherwise seemingly disparate pairing of an ancient 
historian and a theorist of modern sovereign power. 
When asked to distinguish between archeology and genealogy, Foucault 
described archeology as the “aim” of his analysis and genealogy as its “material 
and methodological framework.”4 Whereas Foucauldian inquiry is genealogical 
in its aims and archeological in its method, Momiglianian inquiry is historical in 
its aims and antiquarian in its methods. To distinguish between these two modes 
of inquiry is to conceive the reverberations of history beyond a specific disci-
pline while narrating the emergence of the historical method as a disciplinary 
paradigm.  In the context of this essay, that means tracing the modern discipline 
of history to its origins in post-eighteenth-century Europe. 
In his classic essay “Nietzsche, la généalogie, l’histoire” (1971), Foucault iso-
lates three genealogical registers that help to elucidate Momiglianian antiquari-
3. Momigliano and Foucault also shared a common engagement with the problem of parrhesia 
(free speech). Momigliano’s classic contribution to this subject is “Liberty and Peace in the Ancient 
World,” in Nono contributo alla storia degli studi classici e del mondo antico (Rome: Storia e Let-
teratura, 1992), 483-501; Foucault’s lectures on parrhesia, delivered at the University of California, 
Berkeley in 1983, are collected in Fearless Speech (Los Angeles: Semiotexte, 2001). 
4. Michel Foucault, “Foucault replies to questions from the audience at Berkeley’s History Depart-
ment in 1983,” Audio file transcribed by Arianna Bove at http://www.generation-online.org/p/fpfou-
cault4.htm (accessed January 26, 2014).
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anism. These three registers are methodological, substantive, and metaphysical.5 
The first register pertains to the method that drives antiquarian inquiry. Although 
he explicitly states that genealogy does not oppose itself to history, Foucault—
without invoking Momiglianian antiquarianism—distinguishes between the sub-
ject proper to historical inquiry and the subject proper to antiquarian genealogy. 
Genealogy, writes Foucault, records “events in their singularity [la singularité 
des événements] outside any totalizing finality [hors de toute finalité monotone]. 
Like antiquarianism, genealogy flourishes in realms of minute knowledge [la 
minutie du savoir] and entails vast accumulations of source material [un grand 
nombre de matériaux entassés].6 
Genealogy’s second register pertains to its medium. Genealogy’s monuments 
are constructed, like antiquarian knowledge, from “petites vérités” that bear an 
aura of insignificance, but through methods that are no less rigorous for their 
seeming obscurity than the seemingly more objective discourses of history. The 
third register of Foucault’s discussion pertains to genealogy’s resistance to meta-
physics. Foucault insists that genealogy cannot result from “large, well-meaning 
errors [grandes erreurs bienfaisantes].” Foucault concludes with a perhaps 
unintended allusion to the antiquarian method: genealogy requires “a certain 
eagerness [acharnement] for erudition.”7 Foucault presents these formulations 
as variations on a theme that originates in Nietzsche’s genealogical trilogy—Die 
fröhliche Wissenschaft, Zur Genealogie der Moral, and Menschliches, Allzumen-
schliches—although the French thinker is even more invested than Nietzsche in 
disciplinary methodologies.
A fourth dimension of Foucauldian genealogy also deserves attention in this 
context: namely, genealogy’s relation to silence, and the political implications 
thereof. Foucault imputes to genealogy a burden that can be glossed politically, as 
the art and science of excavating “the silences, the world of memory, of itinerant, 
barely surviving groups, the places of exclusion and invisibility.”8 Without fore-
closing a wide range of possible and even contradictory political deployments, it 
may be observed that Momiglianian antiquarianism parallels Foucauldian geneal-
ogy in its equally profound concern with silences, memories, and with “places of 
exclusion and invisibility.” Whereas Foucault sought to write a counter-history of 
subjugation, silence acquires life in Momigliano’s method through the historian’s 
engagement with what he famously termed “alien wisdom”: ancient Jewish, Egyp-
tian, and Iranian knowledge as viewed through the lens of post-classical Helle-
nism.9 Momigliano’s investigations of alien wisdom are the empirical counterpart 
to his theoretical engagement with nonhistorical methods for excavating the past.
The genealogical principle is enshrined, among other places in Momigliano’s 
oeuvre, in his remarks on Foucault. Although he did not subject Foucault’s work 
5. Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, la généalogie, l’histoire,” Dits et écrits (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), 
II, 136-156. This essay originally appeared in a festschrift to the French Hegelian Jean Hyppolite. 
6. Ibid., 136.
7. Ibid., 137.
8. The citation is from Edward Said, “The Return to Philology,” in Humanism and Democratic 
Criticism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 81, referencing his conception of “humanist 
philology.”
9. Arnaldo Momigliano, Alien Wisdom: The Limits of Hellenization (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990).
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to extended examination in his published writings, Momigliano did attest on 
three memorable occasions to the significance of the Foucauldian genealogical 
method for his understanding of contemporary historiography. Each statement is 
worth considering closely, inasmuch as Momigliano’s engagement with Foucault 
parallels—in certain aspects anticipating and in other respects reflecting—his 
conception of the antiquarian imagination.
Momigliano’s first comment on Foucault occurs in an essay on contemporary 
British intellectual history that he self-consciously frames from the perspec-
tive of his native Piedmont. “The traditional oppositions,” Momigliano writes, 
“between ideas and institutions, between ideology and society, or, quite simply, 
between beliefs and facts have become far too crude to define the new levels 
of exploration” in contemporary intellectual history.10 Momigliano adds that 
this transformation in modern knowledge is most powerfully registered by “the 
astute Michel Foucault” who has “put across his new ‘archéologie du savoir’ 
to replace ‘l’histoire des idées’.” Paraphrasing Foucault’s French, Momigliano 
adds that Foucault aimed to free the history of thought from its transcendental 
subjugation (affranchir l’histoire de la pensée de sa sujéction transcendentale). 
This characterization of Foucault by Momigliano highlights the two thinkers’ 
common interest in change over the longue durée and with specific reference to 
the organization of disciplinary knowledge.
Momigliano’s second allusion to Foucault occurs in an Italian article intended 
to introduce developments in European historiography during the 1960s and 
1970s to an Italian readership. Now writing specifically for an Italian audience, 
Momigliano more ardently appropriates Foucault for his own discipline, history, 
which means in effect assimilating Foucauldian genealogy to his antiquarian 
method. Momigliano states that “If M. Foucault appears in theory as a negator 
of the historical movement [un negatore del movimento storico], his historical 
works are nonetheless infused with an original and profound awareness of intel-
lectual changes [cambiamenti intellettuali].”11 
Returning to British intellectual history, in his third pronouncement on the 
French intellectual, Momigliano compares Foucault to Herodotus in a late essay 
on the ancient Greek historian who was his most important model for his own 
historiographical craft.12 “Perhaps to connect the name Herodotus with that 
of Michel Foucault,” Momigliano writes, “who until yesterday was our most 
original among our contemporary historians, is the best way to indicate what 
the Herodotian tradition can still produce.”13 Measured against Momigliano’s 
profound investment in Herodotus’s legacy, detailed throughout the remainder 
of this essay, the comparison of Foucault to Herodotus appears as the greatest 
10. Momigliano, “A Piedmontese View of the History of Ideas,” Essays in Ancient and Modern 
Historiography (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 5.
11. Momigliano, “La storiografia del quindicennio 1961–1976,” Sesto contributo alla storia degli 
studi classici e del e del mondo antico (Rome: Storia e Letteratura, 1980), 390.
12. Although Thucydides’ historiographical method was the subject of Momigliano’s first major 
scholarly publication, published at the age of twenty-two (“La Composizione della storia di Tuci-
dide,” Memoria della Reale Accademia delle Scienze ditorino 2, no. 67 [1930], 1-48), as discussed 
below, the later stages of his scholarly career evince a much closer affinity for Herodotus. 
13. Momigliano, Ottavo contributo alla storia (Rome: Storia e Letteratura, 1987), 23.
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tribute that could have emerged from Momigliano’s pen. This comparison also 
usefully sets the stage for Momigliano’s genealogy of antiquarian knowledge. 
Admittedly, the ancient historian’s engagement with history differed sharply 
from the French theorist who questioned the historical enterprise as such, just as 
Momigliano’s aspirations diverged from those of Hayden White, whose Meta-
history (1973) proposed reading historical discourse tropologically, or as Momi-
gliano himself critically phrased it, to reduce history to rhetoric.14 (At the same 
time, Momigliano referred to White as a “friend” and was keen to engage with his 
claims concerning the frailty of historical knowledge.) As Peter Miller notes in 
his important study of Momigliano’s antiquarian method, the historian of antiq-
uity does not participate in the “Heideggerian critique of historicity, upon which 
Foucault rests” and which questions the “very foundation in subjectivity that was 
presupposed by the entire Western historical tradition.”15 Much of Momigliano’s 
work in fact rejected precisely the forms of skepticism that underwrote the Fou-
cauldian project, and which for Momigliano were epitomized by early modern 
Pyrrhonists such as Pierre Bayle, Daniel Huet, and La Mothe de Vayer, who 
attacked both “traditional historical teaching” and “traditional religious beliefs.”16 
Their epistemological divergences notwithstanding, the projects on which 
Foucault and Momigliano were embarked during the most fruitful periods of 
their lives—genealogy in the first instance and antiquarianism in the second—
share an ethical orientation, an intellectual ambition, and a political goal of 
fostering appreciation for cultural and conceptual difference. In keeping with 
their shared commitment to assisting in the development and recognition of 
alternative knowledge forms, both thinkers transformed, and continue to trans-
form, the methodologies that structure the humanities and social sciences. Their 
excavations of past textual archives call on us, their posthumous audience, to 
revise regnant disciplinary distinctions when they cease to generate new kinds 
of knowledge. In equally compelling if divergent ways, both Momigliano and 
Foucault crafted knowledge forms that engaged deeply with the past without 
naturalizing the divisions of intellectual labor—between past and present, fact 
and fiction, linearity and synchronicity—that structure and arguably constrain 
modern historiographical inquiry. 
MOMIGLIANIAN ANTIQUARIANISM
Antiquarians from the sixth century bce onwards have found ways to elucidate 
the documentary records inscribed onto epigraphy, coins, and other material rem-
nants from times past, but a sustained historical account of the actual work done 
14. Arnaldo Momigliano, “La retorica della storia e la storia della retorica,” Sui fondamenti delta 
storia antica (Turin: Einaudi, 1984). In Figural Realism: Studies in the Mimesis Effect (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), White called Momigliano’s polemic “basically hostile but 
fair” (180, n. 20). 
15. Peter N. Miller, “Momigliano, Benjamin, and Antiquarianism after the Crisis of Historicism,” 
in Momigliano and Antiquarianism: Foundations of the Modern Cultural Sciences, ed. Peter N. 
Miller (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 364.
16. Momigliano, “Ancient History and the Antiquarian,” Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld 
Institutes 13 (1950), 296 (= Contributo alla storia degli studi classici [Rome: Storia e Letteratura, 
1955], 81.)
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by antiquarianism across the disciplines had to wait until the twentieth century. 
The inaugural manifesto of this modern approach to antiquarian knowledge is 
Momigliano’s 1950 article, “Ancient History and the Antiquarian,” published in 
the journal of the Warburg Institute, Momigliano’s institutional home after he 
was compelled to flee Italy in the years leading up to World War II. Formally 
part of the University of London, the Warburg Institute was Momigliano’s intel-
lectual and institutional haven during what his student Anthony Grafton has 
termed Momigliano’s “middle period,” sandwiched between his early empirical 
studies of Roman history and the interrogations into the meaning and construc-
tion of historiographical knowledge of his final decades.17 “Ancient History and 
the Antiquarian” also contains ab ovo ideas that were later reworked for the 1962 
Sather lectures, delivered at the University of California, Berkeley, and published 
posthumously only in 1990, under the title The Classical Foundations of Modern 
Historiography.18 
Already in his 1950 article, Momigliano engaged two disciplinary trajec-
tories to account for ancient and modern ways of narrating and recording the 
past. Building on the Saussurean distinction between synchrony and diachrony, 
Momigliano proposed that ancient antiquarianism, for which the loci classici 
were Herodotus’s Histories and Varro’s now-lost Antiquitates rerum divinarum 
(c. 47 bce), was preoccupied with change according to a synchronic axis.19 In 
Momigliano’s reading, Roman antiquarianism was more politically inflected than 
its Greek counterpart, and thus more “directly relevant to political life than any 
Hellenistic treatise on the antiquities of a Greek city.”20 Due to the vertical tem-
porality intrinsic to the antiquarian method, both Greek and Roman antiquarians 
were more likely to engage with the ancient than with the recent past. Antiquar-
ians were also more likely to borrow from propagators of myth and were more 
inclined toward philosophy than were their historian counterparts. Thucydides’ 
dismissal of the Homeric epics as valid sources for historical knowledge, and of 
Homer, whose authority was “not equal to those of our own day” and who, as 
a poet, was “expected to exaggerate,” is one of the earliest extant juxtapositions 
17. Anthony Grafton, “Momigliano’s Method and the Warburg Institute: Studies in his Middle 
Period,” in Miller, ed., Momigliano and Antiquarianism, 97-126. For more on this period in Momi-
gliano’s intellectual trajectory, see Grafton, “Momigliano at the Warburg: The Origins of a Style,” 
American Scholar 73, no. 4 (2004), 129-132; Michael Crawford, “L’insegnamento di Arnaldo Momi-
gliano in Gran Bretagna,” in Omaggio ad Arnaldo Momigliano: Storia e storiografia sul mondo anti-
co, ed. Lellia Cracco Ruggini (Como: Biblioteca di Athenaeum, 1989), 27-41. The Warburg Institute 
also hosted a conference series during 2009 entitled “The Legacy of Arnaldo Momigliano.”
18. Momigliano, The Classical Foundations of Modern Historiography, ed. Riccardo Di Donato 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990). 
19. For the synchrony/diachrony distinction (which does not appear in the 1950 article, but does in 
Momigliano’s later work, and which may have derived only indirectly from Saussure), see Ferdinand 
de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, transl. Wade Baskin, ed. Perry Meisel and Haun Saussy 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 81, 89-98. Herodotus figures much more fully as an 
antiquarian in Momigliano’s later work (for example, Classical Foundations) and is not discussed in 
this capacity in the 1950 article.
20. Momigliano, “Ancient History and the Antiquarian,” 289. For an illuminating study of Varro’s 
antiquarian mind that profits from Momigliano’s intervention, see Joseph McAlhany, “Language, 
Truth, and Illogic in the Writings of Varro” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 2003).
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between antiquarian and historical knowledge.21 Notably, Thucydides makes his 
preference clear in the act of juxtaposing these forms of knowledge.
The historian/antiquarian distinction is further elucidated by Herodotus’s 
engagement with Homer. Herodotus also polemicized with Homer over his treat-
ment of Helen, and specifically criticized his predecessor for excluding the Egyp-
tian version of the Helen story from his narrative, but this critique was directed 
to a fellow traveler within a shared intellectual method. Homer may not have 
been a historian for Herodotus (indeed the word had yet to acquire currency dur-
ing Herodotus’s lifetime), but he was certainly a storyteller in the Benjaminian 
sense. Herodotus even accounted for Homer’s exclusions in terms of the formal 
injunctions intrinsic to his chosen genre. Homer, reasons Herodotus, knew of the 
Egyptian story concerning Helen’s sojourn in Egypt, but excluded it from the 
Iliad, “since it was not as appropriate for epic composition” as the story he actu-
ally used.22 Yet even as Herodotus criticized certain of Homer’s poetic choices, it 
is notable that his style and sense of vocation was shaped above all by Homer’s 
poetry, as well as by that of fellow antiquarians from a few generations prior, 
such as Hecataeus of Miletus (fl. 500 bce).23 This intermingling of poetry and his-
tory in Herodotus’s work had already been recognized in antiquity by the author 
of On the Sublime, who described Herodotus as “the most Homeric” (13.3) due 
to his style and language. 
Also indicative of the distance between the historian and antiquarian in antiq-
uity is the fact that whereas Thucydides’ military history was confined to the 
lives of the inhabitants of Hellas, Herodotus’s curiosity took him far beyond 
the boundaries of the Peloponnesian peninsula, partly in consequence of which 
his influence was less extensive than that of his historian rival. Herodotus nar-
rates the past as a global—and not specifically Greek—enterprise from the very 
opening of his narrative. Herodotus explains that he writes so that “the great and 
wonderful deeds—some brought forth by the Hellenes, others by the barbar-
ians—[would] not go unsung” (1.1). For Thucydides, the narration of events 
in time is circumscribed by the interests of specific polities, primarily Sparta, 
Athens, and other Peloponnesian city-states. By contrast, the Herodotian concept 
of inquiry/history is autonomous from any imperative, or even desire, to glorify 
a specific political regime. Consider Herodotus’s critique of Hellenic accounts 
of their gods in his ethnography of Egypt (2.45). This distance is evident in the 
title Herodotus gave to his opus, istoria (ἱστορία), a noun that at the time of its 
composition meant simply “inquiry.”24 When Herodotus writes of the deeds of 
kings, it is in order to enhance his text with the narrative appeal of their lives, and 
21. Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian Wars, transl. Benjamin Jowett (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1900), 8.
22. The Landmark Herodotus, ed. Robert B. Strassler, transl. Andrea Purvis (New York: Anchor 
Books, 2007), 1.116. All future citations from Herodotus are from this edition, and given parentheti-
cally, with reference made only to book and chapter, not to page number.
23. For Herodotus’s debt to Homer, see David Asheri, A Commentary on Herodotus, Books 1-4, 
ed. Oswyn Murray and Alfonso Moreno (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 49. Momigliano 
discusses Hecataeus in Classical Foundations, 9, 15.
24. For this signification, see, among others, Peter G. Bietenholz, Historia and Fabula: Myths and 
Legends in Historical Thought from Antiquity to the Modern Age (Leiden: Brill, 1994), 24.
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to buttress his account with “great and wonderful deeds” (1.1), rather than due to 
any strategic or political mandate. 
As Momigliano reflected on frequently over the course of his career, and par-
ticularly during the years when he was most intensively embarked on the study of 
antiquarianism, historians of antiquity regarded the History of the Peloponnesian 
War as the founding text of their discipline and by comparison discounted the 
Herodotian legacy.25 Thus, whereas we have an essay from Plutarch’s pen enti-
tled “On the Malice of Herodotus,” there is no comparable attempt to discredit 
Thucydides. Herodotus’s synchronic evocation of the past—his willingness to 
situate his narrative self within the stream of events, and to equalize his temporal 
location with the other temporalities operating in his narrative—precluded his 
inclusion in mainstream historiography. As Momigliano recounts, “the very fact 
that each translator and editor of Herodotus found it necessary to defend him 
against Thucydides and Plutarch shows that at the beginning of the sixteenth 
century [Herodotus’s] reputation was, generally speaking, quite bad.”26 
The most decisive marker of a change in attitude was the vindication of his 
work by Heinricus Stephanus, whose Apologia pro Herodoto was published 
in 1566. As Momigliano notes, Stephanus’s work appeared the same year that 
the political theorist Jean Bodin published his comprehensive exposition of the 
historical method, Methodus ad facilam historiarum cognitionem (Method for 
the Easy Comprehension of History), which reframed the discipline of history in 
unprecedentedly global terms. Whether Bodin was more influenced by the anti-
quarian or the historical strain of reflection on the past in this endeavor remains 
an open question. More certain is that Stephanus’s account of Herodotus’s com-
parative method is “a work of decisive importance in European historiography” 
that extended the very scope of possible ways of reflecting on the past.27 
Like Herodotus, Thucydides recognized the pastness of the past, but in the 
latter case, the past/present distinction underwrote a one-sided relation. In 
Thucydides, the historian is severed from his material by virtue of his discursive 
position. In Herodotus, the “inquirer” (to deploy ἱστορία in its literal meaning) 
affiliates so closely with his subjects, including “barbarian” peoples such as the 
Persians and Egyptians, that he projects the names of Greek gods onto their dei-
ties (see 1.131; 2.41; 2.46). Thucydides was the ideal predecessor for historians 
of later eras, such as Ranke, who regarded it as their task to make the past cohere 
through archival research that drove, “like a tank, on indestructible documentary 
treads.”28 By contrast, Herodotus was the ideal predecessor for antiquarians like 
Momigliano who regarded it as their task to narrate the past so compellingly that 
the narrator’s self could merge with his subject. The two roles were not mutually 
exclusive in all cases, and indeed Momigliano arguably came closer than any 
other modern thinker to merging the opposed poles of antiquarian and historical 
25. See Arnaldo Momigliano, “Erodoto e la storiografia moderna,” Aevum 31 (1957), 74-84. 
26. Arnaldo Momigliano, “The Place of Herodotus in the History of Historiography,” in Secondo 
contributo alla storia degli studi classici (Rome: Ed. di Storia e Letteratura, 1984), 42.
27. Ibid.
28. Anthony Grafton, “The Footnote from de Thou to Ranke,” History and Theory 33, no. 4 
(1994), 60.
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knowledge within a single intellect, even as he cognized with greater perspicacity 
than anyone among his contemporaries the significance of this distinction. 
Herodotus did not seek Thucydidian coherence for his varied and internally 
contradictory material, nor did the antiquarians who followed in his footsteps. 
Ancient antiquarians were motivated by the insight that the boundaries between 
past and present were in a state of permanent flux. Thucydides’ opening state-
ment that “the character of the events which preceded, whether immediately or 
in more remote antiquity, owing to the lapse of time cannot be made out with 
certainty” typifies the trajectory taken by the discipline of history in modernity.29 
The bifurcation between the two approaches to the past was reflected in nine-
teenth-century history’s preoccupation with events rather than institutions and 
with political rather than social or structural change. By contrast, antiquarianism, 
like the social-science disciplines that antiquarian knowledge helped to generate, 
reconstructed distant pasts through synchronic methods. Anthropology, sociol-
ogy, economics, and other social sciences were concerned with structural change 
at the level of institutions rather than with the temporary changes signaled by 
events on the battlefield or at the negotiating table. In short, antiquarianism was 
for the longue durée; history was for short-term memory. Antiquarians’ interest 
in the longue durée was of course an interest in the past, but the nature, scope, and 
purpose of this engagement differed radically from that of the historians. 
Momigliano’s paradigmatic contrast over the course of his multi-decade 
inquiry into the sources of the past in modernity was heavily informed by his 
interest in the divergent receptions of Herodotus the antiquarian and Thucydides 
the historian.30 The antiquarian/historian distinction Momigliano made helped to 
elucidate how forms of knowledge that are frequently indiscriminately merged 
with history in the modern sense—the sense that Herodotus could never have 
envisioned, and to which Thucydides approximated much more closely—were 
classed as antiquarian by the writers and readers of antiquity. 
Additionally, the complex reception in European historiography of Greek 
antiquity’s two major narrators of the past served for Momigliano as a larger les-
son about the relations between emergent disciplines, reminding him of the many 
ways in which it was possible to organize knowledge about the past. The light 
Momigliano shed on disciplinary history through this reception demonstrated 
to him the political, epistemic, and metaphysical significance of the choices 
made by these two different disciplines: antiquarian inquiry, which inevitably 
foundered on the impossibility of attaining sure knowledge, and history, which 
was driven by the quest for certainty. As I discuss in greater detail below, Momi-
gliano’s emphasis on the quest for certainty that drove antiquarian knowledge 
derives more from his understanding of early modern antiquarianism than from 
the form of knowledge espoused by Herodotus, who (unlike Momigliano) was 
entirely at home with the contingent conditions that shaped his access to other 
times and places. But this very projection on Momigliano’s part demonstrates the 
29. Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian Wars, 1.
30. The Herodotus/Thucydides contrast is drawn out most explicitly in the Sather lectures (Clas-
sical Foundations, 29-54).
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elasticity of the antiquarian concept, which in part constitutes its relevance to the 
modern discipline of history. 
Momigliano’s intervention is important because he went beyond simply 
reconstructing a lost historical archive. Momigliano made the antiquarian form 
of knowledge legible in and for a world haunted by a Foucauldian awareness 
of the dangers of institutional power, and conscious of the dangerous proxim-
ity between scientific positivism and fascism in modernity. This was a world of 
which Herodotus was innocent even when he laid the framework for the emer-
gence of a future knowledge form. Momigliano was more interested in certainty 
and less willing to question history’s foundational axioms than was Foucault, but 
both figures were wary, with good reason, of modern technologies of power, and 
of the state’s tendency to manipulate historical truth to its advantage. That his 
parents and extended family were exterminated in Auschwitz certainly imparted 
a particular poignancy to Momigliano’s engagement with history, and may also 
have intensified his search for an alternative to his chosen vocation in antiquarian 
ways of confronting, and mourning, the past.31 
ANTIQUARIANISM AND MODERNITY
As he was particularly keen to point out in his later work, Momigliano’s geneal-
ogy of antiquarian knowledge leads from antiquarianism to the social sciences, in 
particular sociology and anthropology. In an age before history was institutional-
ized as a subject of instruction in the academy—an event Momigliano dates to the 
establishment of the first chair in ancient history at Oxford in 162232—or tied to an 
archive, antiquarian research was characterized by an empirical depth unmatched 
by the research undertaken in university contexts. Antiquarians engaged nonliter-
ary evidence, and excavated the material culture that later became archeology’s 
provenance. Some titles that exhibit these tendencies include M. Baudelot de 
Dairval’s De L’Utilité des Voyages et de L’Avantage que la recherche des Antiq-
uitez procure aux Sçavans (1698), Edmund Chishull’s Antiquitates Asiaticae 
(1728), Stuart and Revett’s The Antiquities of Athens (1762), and Winckelmann’s 
Geschichte der Kunst des Alterthums (1764). 
A further paradox of Momigliano’s historian/antiquarian distinction is that 
the antiquarian method was more informed by archival research than was the 
historical method. In this respect if in no others, modern historians such as Ranke 
inherited premodern antiquarian methods, even as they purged their discipline of 
other antiquarian heterodoxies. In Momigliano’s genealogy of the disciplines, 
the archive was “discovered” by the antiquarian rather than the historian. Momi-
gliano illustrates his argument through the example of Edward Gibbon, who, 
soon after leaving Oxford, began his real inauguration into antiquarian inquiry by 
“spending twenty pounds on the twenty volumes of the Memoirs of the Academy 
31. For Momigliano’s dedication to his deceased mother, and the most explicit allusion to the 
Shoah in his entire oeuvre, see Momigliano, Alien Wisdom, vi.
32. Momigliano, “The Introduction of History as an Academic Subject and its Implications,” in 
Ottavo contributo (Rome: Storia e Letteratura, 1987), 161-178.
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of Inscriptions.”33 Through the introduction to antiquarian knowledge afforded 
by these epigraphic collections, after having realized that the type of historical 
inquiry inculcated by the university curriculum could not satisfy his deepest 
dreams, Gibbon was reborn as an antiquarian, and went on to write the greatest 
synthesizing work of historical antiquarianism known to modernity. 
When, in his autobiography, Gibbon later reflected on the decline of antiquar-
ian knowledge during his lifetime, the figures he chose to mark this decline, such 
as Lipsius and Isaac Casaubon, were best known as philologists during their 
lifetimes. This suggests an unexplored path for antiquarian knowledge that is 
beyond the scope of this essay but closely related to my engagement with philol-
ogy’s disciplinary history.34 “In France,” recalled Gibbon, “to which my ideas 
were confined, the learning and language of Greece and Rome were neglected 
by a philosophic age.”35 As a consequence of this downgrading of philological 
knowledge, antiquarian institutions such as the Académie des Inscriptions were 
“degraded to the lowest rank among the three royal societies of Paris: the new 
appellation of Erudits was contemptuously applied to the successors of Lipsius 
and Casaubon.”36 To be an érudit was to be the opposite of a historian, which, in 
the Age of the Enlightenment, meant being passé.
In Momigliano’s accounting, historical research before modernity was based 
primarily on textual documentation rather than on archival reconstruction, which 
was the antiquarian’s domain. Histories aimed to reconstruct precise sequences 
of events chronologically, whereas antiquarians harbored other, temporally more 
expansive, ambitions. Alongside their methodological divergences, the histo-
rian’s subject matter differed from that of the antiquarian. Unlike antiquarianism, 
which dealt in archival minutiae, history dealt in military conquests and defeats 
and diplomacy between states. 
Momigliano’s student Anthony Grafton has pursued his teacher’s insight 
concerning the antiquarian origins of the modern historian’s archive. Grafton 
has documented over the course of numerous works that the valorization of 
the archive inaugurated in the early nineteenth century by Leopold von Ranke 
represents a break with pre-Rankean historiography.37 Antiquarianism from the 
sixteenth century onwards nonetheless incorporated into itself a specifically early 
modern variation on “archive fever.” The rapture expressed by the seventeenth-
century Orientalist Athanasius Kircher is a case in point, leading his biographer 
to ask whether “anyone before Leopold van Ranke” had ever expressed “the 
33. Momigliano, “Ancient History and the Antiquarian,” 285.
34. I refer to my book-in-progress, “Philology’s Contingent Genealogies,” which reads the oeuvres 
of Varro, Vico, Benjamin, Momigliano, and Jacob Bernays as part of a broader conversation about 
philology’s disciplinary history.
35. Edward Gibbon, Memoirs of the Life of Edward Gibbon (London: Methuen, 1900), 123; 
Momigliano, “Ancient History and the Antiquarian,” 308. 
36. Gibbon, Memoirs, 308. For Casaubon’s method, see Benedetto Bravo, “Critice in the Sixteenth 
and Seventeenth Centuries and the Rise of the Notion of Historical Criticism,” in History of Schol-
arship: A Selection of Papers from the Seminar on the History of Scholarship Held Annually at the 
Warburg Institute (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 162-171.
37. In addition to Grafton, “The Footnote from De Thou to Ranke,” see the book-length version of 
this argument: The Footnote: A Curious History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 
34-121. 
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dusty pleasures of archival research with so much visceral pleasure.” Kircher’s 
antiquarian enthusiasm for the archives radiates from the following passage from 
the introduction to his Oedipus Aegyptiacus (Egyptian Oedipus, 1652–1655): 
I consider there to be . . . no art so thoroughly extinct or lost, of which no vestige glimmers 
in some corner of the world unknown to us, or in some foreign library buried under the 
covering of a foreign language . . . or which, broken up and dispersed in many pieces by 
the neglect of time, may not be discovered scattered among the ancient authors.38
Everything is retrievable, suggests Kircher, through the antiquarian method. 
Given the archival resources at the antiquarian’s disposal, and the capacity of 
the emergent science of philology to reconstruct this lost history, early modern 
antiquarians subscribe to the belief that nothing is permanently lost to time. The 
intellectual pursuits cultivated by Kircher and his colleagues diverged from those 
cultivated by their better-patronized historians whose material was easier to 
access, more within the mainstream of already-extant knowledge, and less altered 
by the passage of time. 
First in antiquity and later in early modernity, antiquarians embraced raw and 
internally chaotic material that seasoned historians could not accept without 
seeking to restructure the detritus of the past into meaningful wholes. Whereas 
the antiquarian’s archive consisted of epigraphic inscriptions in obscure and 
sometimes as-yet-to be deciphered languages (consider antiquarians’ attraction 
to Egyptian, Chaldean, Syriac, and other languages that were barely known, if 
at all, to the university curriculum), the historian’s literary material had already 
been varnished by predecessors, who had effectively eliminated any internal 
inconsistencies. 
Momigliano acknowledged history’s heavy rhetorical debt to literary genres 
and styles, even though he was uncomfortable with the way that theorists of 
historiographical inquiry, such as Hayden White, used this debt to support their 
arguments for the tropological status of historical knowledge.39 Equally important 
and less studied is the inverse of this debt: the emergence of antiquarianism from 
nonliterary evidence, including coins, inscriptions, and other material remnants 
and ruins that could not be accommodated within the canons of proper literary 
style. Early modern antiquarianism was literary in that it too cultivated a new 
form of knowledge. At the same time, compared to the historiographical writing 
of its era, the early modern antiquarian imagination, calibrated to the unstructured 
chaos of modern life, worked less easily within the canons of recognized literary 
forms. As Walter Benjamin has famously documented, early modern antiquarian-
ism’s basic object of analysis was the fragment, and its basic vocation was mani-
fested in the collector, who detaches “the object from its functional relations” as 
he goes about assembling his archive.40 
38. Translated in Daniel Stolzenberg, Egyptian Oedipus: Athanasius Kircher and the Secrets of 
Antiquity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 178.
39. For further on the Momigliano–White debate, see Momigliano, “The Rhetoric of History and 
the History of Rhetoric: On Hayden White’s Tropes,” in Comparative Criticism: A Yearbook, ed. E. 
S. Shaffer (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1981), III, 259-268 (and n. 13).
40. Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project, transl. Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin (Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 207. For more extended reflection, see Benjamin’s 
Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels (Berlin: Ernst Rowohlt, 1928). For further kinships between 
Momigliano and Benjamin, see Miller, “Momigliano, Benjamin, and Antiquarianism.”
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Momigliano attributed the decline of antiquarianism in part to the way in 
which history after Gibbon and Mommsen learned to incorporate antiquarian 
methodologies and to recognize the value of nonliterary evidence (including 
epigraphy, coins, and ruins) and to distinguish between primary and secondary 
sources.41 By incorporating synchrony into itself, history transformed and extend-
ed its disciplinary identity. Yet these important insights do not tell the full story 
of antiquarianism’s itinerary or of its relevance to contemporary historiographi-
cal inquiry. Most important, they do not tell us what happened to antiquarianism 
after “history became a way of seeing how the world was formed, how man came 
about, what religion and morality were,” and even came to eclipse other ways of 
reading the past.42 
Once history became what Momigliano calls “a complicated substitute for 
revelation” in the nineteenth century, was there any work left for antiquarianism, 
or for its distant cousin, philology? Momigliano knew that antiquarianism was 
concerned with more than the mindless collection of data, that it was possessed of 
a unique disciplinary logic that could not be subsumed (even when it was assimi-
lated) by history. As a historian, Momigliano was well aware of the logic specific 
to the antiquarian mind and its capacity for embracing human contingency. Yet 
this awareness was never fully reconciled to the oeuvre of a historian whose life 
task was, in the words of his student Peter Brown, “to maintain truth in historical 
studies.”43 A tension was always present in the form of an unresolved question, 
which may indeed have prevented Momigliano from fully explicating the impli-
cations of his history/antiquarian distinction for the future history of disciplinary 
knowledge. 
In other work produced at the Warburg, Momigliano argued that ancient his-
tory had lost the role it possessed until the eighteenth century as our primary 
source of knowledge, not only concerning the past, but also with respect to the 
future. Momigliano made this point in his study of the German Hellenist Fried-
rich Creuzer (1771–1858), a scholar known for his idiosyncratic combination of 
mythography, historiography, and philology influential during his lifetime, but 
largely forgotten in subsequent centuries.44 Like his inaugural study of antiquar-
ian knowledge, Momigliano’s article on Creuzer was composed soon after his 
wartime emigration to England, and thus was conceived at a pivotal juncture in 
his life. But in the Momiglianian genealogy of modern historiography, Gibbon 
stands out most prominently as the last historian who, by combining the craft of 
41. On the antiquarian distinction between primary and secondary sources, see Momigliano, 
“Ancient History and the Antiquarian,” 286, and Simon Ditchfield, Liturgy, Sanctity and History 
in Tridentine Italy: Pietro Maria Campi and the Preservation of the Particular (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), 12.
42. Momigliano, “The Introduction of History as an Academic Subject and its Implications,” 202.
43. Peter Brown, “Remembering Arnaldo,” American Scholar 57, no. 2 (1988), 252. Brown nota-
bly dedicated one of his best-known works, The Body and Society (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1988), to Momigliano’s memory.
44. Momigliano, “Friedrich Creuzer and Greek Historiography,” Journal of the Warburg and 
Courtauld Institutes 9 (1946), 152-163. In the wake of Momigliano’s work, Creuzer’s achievement 
has attracted more attention. See Josine H. Blok, “Quests for a Scientific Mythology: F. Creuzer 
and K. O. Müller on History and Myth,” History and Theory 33, no. 4 (1994), 26-52, and Stephen 
N. Larsen, “Friedrich Creuzer and the Study of Antiquity” (PhD diss., Princeton University, 2008).
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the historian with the empirical passions of the antiquarian, was able to generate 
interpretations of antiquity that made that past indispensable for the future.45 By 
merging antiquarian methods with history, The Decline and Fall of the Roman 
Empire (1776–1788) heralded the decline of one discipline, antiquarianism, and its 
replacement by a newly reconfigured discipline of history that borrowed heavily 
from the form of knowledge it had replaced, frequently without acknowledgment. 
Much of Momigliano’s work on the historian/antiquarian relation was pub-
lished only posthumously. The most provocative discussion of this topic among 
Momigliano’s published works, his Sather lectures, had to wait decades for publi-
cation, notwithstanding their considerable impact on the auditors who were lucky 
enough to hear them delivered at the University of California, Berkeley, in 1962.46 
Perhaps Momigliano delayed the publication of this magnum opus for so many 
years because he was overwhelmed by the scope of his project, and challenged 
by the task of synthesizing it into a coherent whole. That Momigliano was awed 
by the magnitude of the task he had set himself is suggested by his description, in 
a 1967 letter to the Marxist philologist Sebastiano Timpanaro, of his life’s work 
as having been preoccupied by three themes: “the influence of Greco-Roman and 
Jewish historical thought on subsequent generations of historical thought; the 
organization that ancient political and social structures provided or didn’t provide 
to stabilize peace and to ensure freedom of action and of discussion; [and] the 
position of Jews and of Jewish civilization [civilità ebraica] in the ancient world 
and after.”47 For Momigliano to have assembled the Sather lectures into publish-
able form during his lifetime would have meant writing his own epitaph. 
With respect to the project that Momigliano lists first among his lifelong preoc-
cupations, of illuminating the impact of Greco-Roman and Jewish historiography 
on modern historiographical inquiry, he promises Timpanaro that this theme 
will “stand out more clearly in the still unpublished Sather lectures.” Although 
Momigliano’s vision of antiquarianism and its location within the history of the 
disciplines was elucidated when these lectures were published, the illumination 
did not arrive until nearly a quarter-century after the promise was made. As the 
use made here of Foucauldian genealogy is intended to suggest, even though 
Momigliano’s impact on classical and early modern historiography has been 
substantial and widely acknowledged, Momiglianian antiquarianism still awaits 
recognition within the theoretically oriented subdisciplines of historical inquiry, 
including those, such as critical theory, that engage with the philosophy of history 
without conceiving of themselves as “historical” per se.
45. “Edward Gibbon fuori e dentro la cultura italiana,” Studi romani 24 (1976), 9-23; “Gibbon 
from an Italian Point of View,” Daedalus 105, no. 3 (1976), 125-135; “Gibbon’s Contribution to 
Historical Method,” Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte 2, no. 4 (1954), 450-463.
46. For the impact of Momigliano’s genealogy on John Howland Rowe, a historian of anthropol-
ogy’s origins who was a professor at Berkeley when Momigliano delivered his lectures, see his two 
articles: “The Renaissance Foundations of Anthropology,” American Anthropologist n.s. 67 (1965), 
1-20, esp. p. 15, n.1, and “Ethnography and Ethnology in the Sixteenth Century,” Kroeber Anthropo-
logical Society Papers 30 (1964), 1-19. 
47. “Il primo interesse dovrebbe apparire più nitidamente nelle Sather Lectres ancora inedite.” 
Cited in Riccardo Di Donato, “Filologia, marxismo, guerre e altro: dal carteggio Momigliano-Timpa-
naro,” La Gazzetta di Pisa 3, no. 7/3 (March 2001), 2-3. 
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In addition to obscuring the force of Momigliano’s vision, the sporadic pub-
lication history of Momigliano’s disciplinary genealogy has made it difficult to 
fully assess the lineage the Italian historian postulated leading from Herodotus 
and Varro to the modern social sciences. Recent scholarship has drawn attention 
to the visionary aspects of Momigliano’s thinking on this topic, thereby giving 
credence to Peter Miller’s argument that Momigliano authorized his genealogy 
“in such an offhand way, in a publication that appeared so long after most people 
had formed their impression of his notion of antiquarianism, that its call has 
not been heard, let alone heeded.”48 Even as the implications of genealogy for 
Momigliano’s method remain unexamined, the existing scholarship on Momigli-
anian antiquarianism has also not yet come to terms with the fragmentary status 
of Momigliano’s publications on this subject. For a topic so central to his life’s 
work, the slow pace of this highly productive scholar’s writings on antiquarian-
ism is somewhat unusual. Momigliano never systematized his genealogy of the 
disciplines in a scholarly monograph or other comprehensive study. Archival 
research, of the sort underway at Pisa-based Archivio Arnaldo Momigliano, will 
surely shed more light on Momigliano’s contributions to the history of antiquar-
ian knowledge.49 But a full reconstruction will need to go beyond examining 
Momigliano’s own statements, published and unpublished, and engage with the 
primary sources on which the greatest modern historian of ancient historical 
knowledge based his morphology of disciplinary knowledge. We will need, in 
short, to adopt a Foucauldian perspective on the oeuvre generated by this theorist 
of modern knowledge forms.
Like a latter-day antiquarian, Momigliano violates many conventions of mod-
ern academic historiography. He melds past and present with seemingly effortless 
grace. As if channeling Herodotus into his writing style, Momigliano inserts his 
historical self into the historian’s narrative. Also like Herodotus, Momigliano 
resists, sometimes vociferously, attempts to reduce history to mere assemblages 
of dates and names. He prefers instead to emphasize biography. One of the best 
treatments of Momigliano’s method, by G. W. Bowersock, is tellingly entitled 
“Momigliano’s Quest for the Person.”50 As Peter Brown accurately noted, Momi-
gliano distinguished himself from his immediate predecessors in the field of the 
study of Roman antiquity, Mikhail Rostovtzeff, Ronald Syme, and Hugo Jones, 
because “he felt that they overlooked that all-important residuum of human 
48. Peter N. Miller, “Introduction: Momigliano, Antiquarianism, and the Cultural Sciences,” in 
Miller, ed., Momigliano and Antiquarianism, 52. Among other recent considerations of Momigliano’s 
genealogy, the work of Mark Salber Phillips is noteworthy. See his “Reconsiderations on History 
and Antiquarianism: Arnaldo Momigliano and the Historiography of Eighteenth-Century Britain,” 
Journal of the History of Ideas 57, no. 2 (1996), 297-316.
49. As the recently published catalog of Momigliano’s Pisa archive indicates, vast quantities of 
Momigliano’s writings and correspondence still await publication. See Giovanna Granata, L’Archivio 
Arnaldo Momigliano: Inventario Analitico (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 2006). Further 
unpublished work may be expected from the tenth contributo (in preparation for publication, accord-
ing to the statement of Riccardo Di Donato, in Miller, ed., Momigliano and Antiquarianism, 68) and 
Peace and Liberty in the Ancient World: The Cambridge Lectures 1940 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, forthcoming).
50. G. W. Bowersock, “Momigliano’s Quest for the Person,” in The Presence of the Historian: 
Essays in Memory of Arnaldo Momigliano, History and Theory, Beiheft 30 (1991), 27-36.
ANTIQUARIANISM AS GENEALOGY 227
motivation.”51 When we conceive of Momigliano as a historian whose antiquar-
ian predilections prevent him from erasing his own historicity from his narra-
tives, we are in a better position to understand how the antiquarian method, when 
applied to modern historiography, can obliterate the distance that conditions and 
constitutes modern historical inquiry and that lies at the very foundation of his-
torical objectivity.52 In Momigliano’s perception, the tension between history and 
the antiquarian imagination gives rise to new knowledge, and not merely to the 
destruction of old methodologies. 
Scholars prior to Momigliano had noted that ancient άρχαιολογία (arche-
ology) as a discipline was preeminently concerned with “the genealogies of 
heroes and men and the early foundations of cities.”53 But Momigliano’s read-
ings of άρχαιολογία in ancient Greece and antiquitates in ancient Rome and 
medieval Europe imparted to an ongoing inquiry a conceptual coherence that, 
for the first time in modern disciplinary history, could forcefully transform an 
entire discipline. Antiquarian knowledge as narrated through the Momiglianian 
prism is crucial to any genealogy of the disciplines, including the Foucauldian 
one, inasmuch as, more than any other discipline, antiquarianism foregrounds 
the forms of knowledge history traditionally excluded from its purview. Taking 
account of epigraphy, numismatics, and other nonliterary artifacts that enter the 
historiographical record by way of temporal difference (diachrony) rather than 
through filiation and narrative interest (synchrony), antiquarianism is in potentia 
a critique of actually existing historiography. It is an argument in favor of the 
fragment, an appeal to uncertainty, an argument that discerns agency, and hence 
freedom, not in the ability of retrospective interpreters to ascertain the facts 
beyond a doubt, but in the ability of archival excavations to instill wonder and 
awe in those who make their findings lucid to the world.54 
Wonder and awe are of course inevitably accompanied by doubt, and herein 
lies the Achilles’ heel of Momiglianian genealogy. For even if it were true that 
early modern antiquarians “could justly congratulate themselves that the quality 
and quantity of the documents they used conferred on the knowledge of the past a 
greater certainty than that extracted from literary sources” in their methodological 
drive for “greater certainty,” early modern antiquarians were by no means car-
rying on the traditions pioneered by their ancient predecessors, who were more 
concerned with instilling doubt than with establishing certainty.55 Herodotus’s 
invocation of the words of Solon, king of Athens, to the Lydian king Croesus, is 
instructive in this regard. When asked by the arrogant Lydian king to ratify his 
51. Brown, “Remembering Arnaldo,” 252.
52. For a stimulating consideration of distance as a normative aspect of post-Romanticist historiog-
raphy, see, among others, Mark Philips, “Relocating Inwardness: Historical Distance and the Transi-
tion from Enlightenment to Romantic Historiography,” PMLA 118 (2003), 436-449. 
53. Eduard Norden, Agnostos Theos: Untersuchungen zur Formengeschichte religiöser Rede 
(Stuttgart: Teubner, 1956), 372.
54. Compare Walter Benjamin on a story told by Herodotus in his essay on the storyteller: “This 
story from ancient Egypt [by Herodotus] is still capable of arousing astonishment [Staunen] and 
thoughtfulness [Nachdenken]” (Benjamin, “Der Erzähler,” Gesammelte Schriften—Werkausgabe 
[Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1980], 445-446).
55. Riccardo Di Donato, “Momigliano from Antiquarianism to Cultural History,” in Miller, ed., 
Momigliano and Antiquarianism, 75.
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belief that he was the happiest man in the world, Solon replies in an instructively 
contrarian fashion that indexes the importance Herodotus places on uncertainty 
as a condition of intellectual inquiry. “Croesus,” says Solon, “human life is pure 
chance. You seem to be very wealthy, and you rule over many people, but I 
cannot yet tell you the answer you asked for until I learn how you ended your 
life” (1.32.4-5). On encountering these strategically situated lines, the reader is 
confronted with this ancient antiquarian’s epistemic goal. As indicated in Solon’s 
advice to Croesus, this agenda was more interested in instilling doubt, of remind-
ing readers and listeners of the contingent conditions through which their knowl-
edge about the past is constituted, than in establishing certainty. 
Indeed, had he been able to witness the life taken by the discipline he helped 
to found, Herodotus would likely have criticized the modern historical quest for 
fetishizing certainty. Momigliano endorsed modern historiography’s sanctifica-
tion of certainty, and sought to buttress it through the application of antiquarian 
methods to historical inquiry. For Herodotus, the quest for certainty would have 
signified inexcusable hubris on a par with Xerxes’ refusal to heed Artobanus’s 
advice against waging war on the Athenians, an act that ultimately brought about 
the defeat of the Persian empire (7.10.3; 7.50.2). Hence, at least with respect to 
the most important antiquarian of ancient Greece, it needs to be acknowledged, 
pace Momigliano, that the alignment between antiquarianism and the quest for 
certainty is not internally consistent, unless the impossibility of knowing can be 
regarded as a form of certainty in its own right, and methodological inquiry can 
be structured according to this insight.
Because he so closely aligned himself with the historical quest for certainty 
(while distancing himself from, or simply refusing to recognize, the antiquarian 
cultivation of doubt), Momigliano never fully cognized the disjuncture between 
ancient antiquarians’ embrace of contingency and early modern antiquarians’ 
quest for certain knowledge. At the same time, Momigliano did go some distance 
toward recognizing the hermeneutical—and not merely the historical or archi-
val—value of antiquarian knowledge, even when he focused on early modern 
antiquarianism. In the groundbreaking 1950 article that launched a new subfield 
of inquiry, Momigliano wrote that early modern antiquarians revealed “how to 
use non-literary evidence, but they also made people reflect on the difference 
between collecting facts and interpreting facts.”56 By increasing the scope for 
interpretation in engaging with the past, early modern antiquarians constituted 
themselves as true heirs to the Herodotian emphasis on doubt. 
Given Momigliano’s abiding interest in history as a means of establishing 
truth, it goes without saying that the foregoing attempt to vindicate Momigliano’s 
conception of antiquarian knowledge as a form of negative historical inquiry, 
and as a destruction of certain kinds of historical certainties, requires reading 
Momigliano the historian against the grain (an activity perhaps more attractive 
to a scholar of literature, such as myself, than to scholars with other disciplinary 
affiliations). At the same time, Momigliano’s occasional revelations of his anti-
56. Momigliano, “Ancient History and the Antiquarian,” 286. See also on this aspect of Momi-
gliano’s methodology, Karl Christ, “Arnaldo Momigliano and the History of Historiography,” History 
and Theory, Beiheft 30 (1991), 5-12.
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quarian self, particularly in his autobiographical writings, as well as his frequently 
articulated kinship for the renegade antiquarians from Herodotus to Foucault who 
have haunted the modern historiographical project, suggest that this contradictory 
intellectual might not have found such a contrarian reading of his oeuvre entirely 
alien. Momigliano’s insights concerning the attractions of antiquarian knowledge 
in a post-historical age—an age that looks on positivism with increasing skepti-
cism, and that is likely to find more use in the varieties of doubt and contingency 
than in mirages of certainty—add further substance to such a reading. 
Throughout his voluminous oeuvre, Momigliano explored and also modified 
the proposition he first advanced in 1950 that the modern social sciences origi-
nated in the ancient antiquarianism of Herodotus, Dionysus of Halicarnassus, and 
Varro. According to Momigliano’s trajectory, antiquarianism breathed its last in 
response to the so-called Pyrrhonist crisis of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, 
when, due in part to Descartes and Bacon, the possibility of attaining certain 
knowledge was permanently called into question.57 Culminating in Hume, this 
new movement derived from Sextus Empiricus, a Hellenistic philosopher whom 
the major historian of modern skepticism, Richard Popkin, has labeled “obscure 
and unoriginal” although even by Popkin’s assessment Sextus had a “dramatic 
role in the formation of modern thought.”58 
The antiquarian response to the new Empiricism asserted the value and indeed 
the necessity of certain knowledge based on the resources of material culture. 
Numismatics, archeology, textual criticism, and other synchronic methodologies 
were all either invented or revived during the early modern period, on the basis 
of ancient collections of epigraphy and other forms of material culture. In spite, 
or perhaps precisely because, of their dependence on their antiquarian predeces-
sors, Joseph Justus Scaliger (c. 1609) and Giambattista Vico (d. 1744) radically 
revised ancient precedents.59 Their revisions were accomplished through feats 
of hermeneutical exegesis, in Vico’s case of Roman law, in Scaliger’s case of 
ancient chronology.60 As much as separates the agendas of Herodotus, Varro, 
Vico, Scaliger, and other major early modern antiquarians who have gone 
unmentioned here, such as Mabillon (d. 1707) and Montfaucon (d. 1741), Momi-
glianian antiquarianism, in the revisionary account I have presented here, accom-
modates, and is enriched by, them all. 
ANTIQUARIANISM AS GLOBAL KNOWLEDGE FORM
Although attention to the antiquarianisms of Europe and Greek antiquity has 
occupied the bulk of this essay, Asian and Islamicate antiquarianisms have as 
57. For an alternative periodization (which questions Momigliano’s account), see Markus Völkel, 
“Pyrrhonismus historicus” und “fides historica”: die Entwicklung der deutschen historischen Meth-
odologie unter dem Gesichtspunkt der historischen Skepsis (Frankfurt: Lang, 1987), 342-344.
58. Richard H. Popkin, History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1979), 19.
59. Scaliger’s most immediate predecessor in this regard was Crates of Mallon; Vico’s predeces-
sors were Varro and Augustine. The debates among these figures, internal to the field of antiquarian 
philology, are discussed in Philology’s Contingent Genealogies (see n. 33 above). 
60. Worth noting with respect to the ancient/early modern antiquarian connection is M. Terenti 
Varronis Opera cum notis J. Scaligeri (Paris: A. Turnebi, 1585).
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much to contribute to our conceptualization of antiquarian knowledge as to the 
emergent critique of modern historical knowledge forms. Non-European anti-
quarianisms have been as revolutionary in their own milieus as Herodotus’s insis-
tence on doubt and the early modern antiquarian quest for certainty were within 
their respective worlds.61 In disciplinary terms, antiquarianism extends the very 
meaning and purpose of historical inquiry, by extending the range of legitimate 
sources, changing the questions that can be posed of material from the past, and 
shifting the terms according to which the answers are evaluated. In contemporary 
terms, antiquarianism gives life to the ancient vocation of criticism, which, more 
in eras past than in times present, has at its most powerful been both histori-
cally and philologically inflected.62 None of these functions can reasonably be 
restricted to any single geography.
Once we grasp the mutual debts of antiquarianism and criticism in terms of 
Momigliano’s disciplinary trajectory, antiquarianism’s potential to realize itself in 
contemporary contexts will be unleashed. Friedrich Nietzsche famously warned 
that antiquarianism can be reduced to “a blind mania for collecting [Sammelwut], 
a restless compiling of everything that has ever existed.”63 Yet in that very move-
ment toward the antiquarian alternative to history—conceived in modern terms 
as archival reconstruction driven by a passion for the obscure, the forgotten, the 
oppressed, and the otherwise unassimilated—another form of knowledge stands 
revealed. The bricoleur figure put forward by French anthropologist Claude Lévi-
Strauss shares with Momigliano’s antiquarian, Foucault’s genealogist, and Ben-
jamin’s collector a special relationship to mythical thought as well as a particular 
methodology. Most congruently with the ways of knowing cultivated by antiquar-
ians, the bricoleur goes about his work of assembling into systems the fragments 
that cross his path without taking account of the “availability of raw materials and 
tools conceived and procured for the purposes of a project.”64
A defining characteristic of the bricoleur’s methodology is thus that, because 
his knowledge is constituted from fragments, it is uniquely capable of transcend-
ing the time-space coordinates within which it is generated. In my view, this pecu-
liarity goes some distance toward explaining why antiquarian knowledge is better 
suited to understanding the diversity of world culture, and more adept at dealing 
with cultural difference, than are the more conservative strains of historical knowl-
edge. The Herodotus/Thucydides contrast that has structured this essay, and that 
structured much of Momigliano’s work, is an obvious illustration of the global 
61. Modern scholarship of Asian antiquarianism, particularly that which takes account of Momi-
gliano’s intervention, is still in its infancy. The most important recent contribution to this emerging 
field of inquiry is Antiquarianism and Intellectual Life in Europe and China, 1500–1800, ed. Peter N. 
Miller and François Louis (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2012). See also Tamara Chin, 
“Antiquarian as Ethnographer: Han Ethnicity in Early China Studies,” in Critical Han Studies: The 
History, Representation, and Identity of China’s Majority, ed. Thomas Mullaney et al. (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2012). 
62. For a brilliant account of the emergence of the concept of criticism in relation to antiquarian-
ism (here in the guise of philology) and history, see Bravo, “Critice in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth 
Centuries and the Rise of the Notion of Historical Criticism.”
63. Friedrich Nietzsche, Werke in drei Bänden, ed. Karl Schlechta (Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag, 
1954), I, 228. 
64. Claude Lévi-Strauss, The Savage Mind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), 17.
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scope of antiquarian knowledge, given Herodotus’s unchallenged reputation as 
the most globally attuned writer of Greek antiquity as compared to Thucydides’ 
comparative lack of interest in non-Greek civilizations, but there are others. 
When Momigliano wrote as a historian, he wrote of ancient Rome, Greece, 
early modern Europe: subjects that were close to home. When Momigliano wrote 
as an antiquarian, he wrote of the strange and unfamiliar, of that which was, by 
definition, impossible to know. The comparative globality of the antiquarian 
imagination when juxtaposed to the comparative provincialism of the historical 
imagination helps to clarify antiquarianism’s contribution to the synchronic-
ally organized comparative social sciences, and in particular to the discipline 
of anthropology, which has been and continues to be more global in scope than 
mainstream historiography. (History is arguably the most diverse discipline 
within the humanities, encompassing nearly all geographies and all ways of 
knowing, but the point here is simply that the dominant modes of knowing 
within mainstream historiography are not generally informed by non-European 
archives.) Herodotus is of course also claimed by the discipline of anthropology, 
and often with the same enthusiasm that he is assimilated into the canon of his-
tory’s history.65
Momigliano himself compellingly exemplifies the global outlook facilitated 
by antiquarian knowledge, for one of the most underappreciated aspects of his 
intellectual achievements is his deep reading in and knowledge of non-European 
traditions, which enabled Momigliano to generate profound (if brief) compara-
tive accounts of global historical knowledge.66 During those rare but priceless 
moments in his oeuvre when Momigliano engaged in comparative reflections 
on global historiography, the results were striking. Rather than posit the Greco-
Roman or European historiographical tradition as the absolute—although he 
might have been expected to do so, given that these were the areas of his primary 
expertise—Momigliano consistently viewed Asian and Islamic historiographical 
traditions on their own terms. In “Tradition and the Classical Historian” (1972), 
Momigliano invoked classical Islamic, Chinese, and Danish historiography to 
tell us not how they fell short of the Greco-Roman tradition, but to indicate with 
greater precision the various qualities that the Greco-Roman tradition lacked.67 
When Momigliano ponders the problem that has often bedeviled Indologists, 
and that was famously flagged by Hegel in his lectures on the philosophy of 
history, concerning the lack of a robust historiographical tradition in premodern 
India (aside from Islamic historiographies composed primarily in Persian), his 
comments reflect the antiquarian tendency to understand cultural and historical 
difference pluralistically, in terms of their own time and place, to approach the 
seemingly anomalous with humility, and to refrain from engaging in grandiose 
absolutist and essentialist claims about civilizational difference of the kind that 
65. See, for example, James Redfield, “Herodotus the Tourist,” Classical Philology 80, no. 2 
(1985), 97-118. Redfield incidentally thanks Momigliano for his comments on this essay in his 
introductory note (p. 97). 
66. Grafton alludes to Momigliano’s reading of classical Chinese historiography in “Arnaldo 
Momigliano: A Pupil’s Notes,” American Scholar 60, no. 2 (1991), 238.
67. Arnaldo Momigliano, “Tradition and the Classical Historian,” History and Theory 11, no. 3 
(1972), 284.
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the more prolific nineteenth-century historians used to buttress their methodolo-
gies. Resisting all of these temptations to which many of his fellow historians 
succumbed (not least among them Hegel, when he wrote in a self-consciously 
historicist mode), Momigliano reflects with astonishing accuracy on this problem 
of the absence of an indigenous historiographical tradition in Indian history, con-
sidering how far the subject lies from his actual expertise. “The poverty of Indian 
historiography,” Momigliano writes, “must be judged with reference to a world in 
which normally history counted far less than it counts now: indeed history, rather 
than determining the character of civilization, was normally inferior to religion, 
rhetoric, poetry, philosophy, and derived its values from them.”68 
Momigliano’s methodological response to the problem of the supposed 
“absence” of Indian history presumes no deep erudition concerning Indian 
knowledge systems.69 It does, however, presume a brilliantly sophisticated 
framework for engaging in global comparison. The much more common historio-
graphical move (and the one to which, as noted, Hegel succumbed) would have 
been to present European modernity, when historical discourse was naturalized 
as a condition for civilizational attainment, as the comparative norm, and to find 
all civilizations that fell short of this standard to be lacking. Instead of pursuing 
this conventional path, Momigliano defamiliarizes Europe. He makes strange the 
world that would make the existence of a robust historiographical tradition into 
a norm. Such is the antiquarian imagination in action. Some theorists of histori-
cal knowledge would argue that such acts of defamiliarization are cultivated by 
history in general, without presuming any debt to antiquarian inquiry. I would 
argue to the contrary that history is only favorable to defamiliarization when it is 
enriched by the antiquarian method, and that all too frequently historians neglect 
the substantial benefits conferred on their discipline by antiquarian knowledge. 
The failure of many historians to live up to the broad-minded norms exemplified 
by Herodotus, Foucault, and Momigliano is largely a function of history’s sup-
pression of antiquarian knowledge in consequence of its quest for absolute truth. 
Momigliano would of course have disagreed with some of the assessments 
offered here, particularly with respect to his own work. He would have insisted 
that it was the antiquarians who, even more than the historians, made possible 
the pursuit of certain knowledge about the events of times past, and, further, that 
the search for truth necessarily figures into any ethically grounded engagement 
with the past. These divergences are not matters that can be easily, or even fruit-
fully, resolved. Rather than seeking to clarify the status of truth in Momigliano’s 
historiography, which many commentators have shown to be central to his intel-
lectual agenda, I have sought to highlight the importance of doubt, a value that 
in my view permeates Momigliano’s work, if less explicitly than the concern 
for truth, and that is aligned with his profoundly philosophical awareness of the 
contingency of human knowledge. 
68. Arnaldo Momigliano, “Remarks on Eastern History Writing,” in Terzo contributo alla storia 
degli studi classici e del mondo antico (Rome: Ed. di Storia e Letteratura, 1966), 236.
69. The most compelling recent engagement with this problem from the perspective of South 
Asian studies is Ranajit Guha, History at the Limit of World-History (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2003).
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Momigliano’s writings do not suggest any extensive conscious engagement 
with doubt, certainly not with the same intensity as can be observed in Herodo-
tus (see, for example, 7.54.3), or in other, later products of the antiquarian 
imagination. Yet one of Momigliano’s most influential students, the classicist 
Peter Brown, who consistently describes himself as a historian (rather than an 
antiquarian), nonetheless has articulated the purpose of historical knowledge in 
ways that strikingly resemble his teacher’s methodological humility, and that 
evoke Momigliano’s ability to empathize with the unknown, the distant, and the 
foreign. Reflecting on the benefits of historicizing one’s own self, Brown writes, 
“A little history . . . counters the amiable tendency of learned persons to think 
of themselves as if they were hang-gliders, hovering silently and with Olympian 
ease above their field.”70 In Brown’s view, one purpose of history, and particu-
larly histories of our selves, is to teach us that “we are in no way different from 
the historical figures whom we study in the distant past: we are embodied human 
beings caught in the unrelenting particularity of space and time.” The unrelenting 
particularity of space and time, of human contingency, human freedom, and the 
eternal recurrence of doubt, is the domain of antiquarian knowledge. 
From the point of view of disciplinary critique, and of the disciplinary gene-
alogies on which Momigliano and Foucault were embarked, the value of anti-
quarianism lies less in its actual yield than in the paths it forges for new forms of 
intellectual inquiry. Antiquarianism enables the persistent critique of history. It 
helps us read history against itself. It considers events, people, places, and things 
in their singularity, as fragments that may or may not cohere into a whole. In 
chronicling in Foucauldian fashion the normativity of institutions, and in refus-
ing to treat them as immune to the vagaries of power, it offers ways of thinking 
outside bureaucratic structures, such as the state. Antiquarian inquiry enables 
material to transform method, and trains humanists and social scientists alike to 
confront the epistemic consequences of human contingency, even as they seek to 
reconcile the need for certainty with the ethical advantages of doubt.
Rather than positing the perfectibility of the human intellect, antiquarianism 
recognizes what is not knowable. Frequently, scientifically oriented disciplines 
in their more positivist phases militate against the humility cultivated by Momi-
gliano and Brown. As perhaps the last great historian to traverse the disparate 
domains of antiquarianism and history with equal grace, Momigliano’s vision 
enables scholars to reclaim antiquarianism as their rightful vocation among the 
diversity of humanistic knowledge forms. Momigliano’s antiquarian genealogy, 
like his genealogical antiquarianism, helps those of us concerned with the future 
of the past and the history of the present to insure that our quests for certain 
knowledge never lose sight of the contingency of all things human. 
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